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THE SALE OF A LAW PRACTICE
JAMEs K. STERRETT, it
Recently some members of the Bar have received notices from
self-proclaimed "professional practice brokers" offering their services
in arranging the purchase or sale of a law practice. Carefully worded
circulars advise potential sellers that they can sell not only the assets
of the practice, including the law library, office furniture and equip-
ment, and accounts receivable, but also any work in process, contingent
fee cases, custody of records, and good will. Prospective buyers are
asked to consider the "immediate high income" that can follow the
purchase of someone else's practice. Attorneys are advised that a
good reason for using the brokerage services is that "all negotiations
are conducted with a maximum of discretion and lack of publicity."
This is important, the circulars state, because "[i]t is almost impos-
sible for an owner to sell his own practice without identifying himself
to all prospective buyers. This usually results in the information
reaching the employees and clients, resulting in some damage to the
practice before it can be sold or transferred." Furthermore, the brokers
claim their expertise is needed to best "transfer the practice success-
fully" and handle "letters of introduction."
The advertisements do not mention that the sale or purchase of a
law practice, if not carefully structured to avoid any attempt to trans-
fer client relationships, will violate ethical tenets of the legal profession
and corresponding fiduciary obligations imposed by law. A party to
such a transaction not only might be subject to severe sanction by a
disciplinary board, but also may find, after performing his part of the
bargain, that the sale agreement is not judicially enforceable against the
other party. The seller may additionally be liable to his former clients
for all profits made in the sale not allocable to the accretion in value
of the practice's tangible assets.
This Article will first outline briefly the method in which a
practice is sold. The second section will analyze the ethical and fidu-
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1 A typical flyer is set forth in an appendix to this Article.
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ciary principles which apply when an attorney attempts to sell his
practice. The principles involved suggest that a sole practitioner is un-
able to capitalize upon the reputation and prestige of his practice, but,
with careful planning and the assistance of his partners, a member of a
partnership can. In the third section a justification based on the protec-
tion of clients' expectations and interests will be advanced for this
marked disparity. In conclusion, several recommendations will be made
in the hope that attorneys will resist the financial inducement to buy
or sell practices, but instead will plan for an orderly, yet profitable,
method of succession consistent with their clients' interests.
I. Tm TYPICAL SALE
An attorney's practice cannot literally be sold. Although chairs,
desks, office furnishings, lease, and library can be sold outright, clients
and their loyalties cannot be. An individual is free to select whomever
he desires to represent him and may "discharge the lawyer at any time
for any reason."2 Nevertheless, attorneys are occasionally willing to pay
substantial amounts to purchase the "good will" of an established
lawyer's practice, because with the departing lawyer's cooperation
client relationships can be transferred almost as readily as chairs and
desks.
A purchase is usually accomplished in the following manner. S
An individual desires to retire or to move to another part of the
country, or a practice is sold because of a lawyer's death or disability.
The retiring practitioner or his representative turns over both his
tangible assets, such as chairs and law books, and his intangible assets
(files and client lists). A retiring practitioner then contacts his clients,
either by printed notices or telephone calls, informing them that the
purchaser is now handling their affairs and any pending cases they
may have, thereby introducing them to the successor. If the death or
disability of a lawyer precipitates the sale, a representative of the estate
or the successor himself will indicate to the clients that, if they desire,
the successor will represent them. In a subtle manner, the retiring
2 L. PATTERSON, & E. CHEATHAMu, THE PRoEssIoN OF LAW 247 (1971).
3 Interview with Daniel J. Cantor, Management Consultant to the Legal Profession,
in Philadelphia, Apr. 12, 1972.
In this Article reference to the sale of a partnership interest is limited to those
situations in which a withdrawing or deceased partner's interest is sold to a previously
unassociated attorney with the amount of the sale consideration determined by bargain-
ing between the purchaser and the withdrawing partner (or the deceased partner's
estate) with the consideration being paid to such seller. Excluded are those situations
in which an entering partner, whether a newcomer or a former associate, pays a capital
contribution to the firm. Also excluded from consideration are law firm mergers in-
volving the payment of compensation and those in which a solo practitioner merges his
practice with a firm and remains as a partner of the new firm.
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attorney or the representative suggests that the clients "continue"
with the successor, praising the successor's professional talents and
recommending his services. No disclosure is made that the practice
is being sold or that the successor is in effect paying for the recom-
mendation. The sale is usually accompanied by restrictive covenants
in which the seller promises not to practice in the local vicinity; such
covenants are especially common if the retiring attorney has a strong
personal following. In other situations, the practice is sold by a de-
ceased attorney's estate with the executor or widow similarly recom-
mending the successor to the clients of the deceased. Most sales are
made by sole practitioners, but occasionally partnership interests are
sold by a retiring partner to a previously unassociated attorney.
Sometimes a more gradual method of succession is used to permit
new attorneys to establish firmer relationships with the clients and to
allow the clients to become accustomed to the successor's handling of
their affairs. To accomplish this the practice may acquire a new name,
"Old Practitioner and Successor," which is often retained after the
senior's departure. The period in which the two lawyers associate may
be less than one year. During this period of time, the buyer and seller
may actually operate as a partnership, sharing the profits of their
association and arranging that at the time of the senior's departure
he will be compensated both for his participation in any remaining
cases and for his origination of business. On occasion, however, the
buyer pays a flat salary to the seller.
Purchasers generally pay for the practice in one of two ways. The
simpler is a sum certain, paid either upon succession or in installments.
The other is to split a portion of the gross or net revenues with the
seller or the estate for a specified period of years following the transfer.
II. ETHICAL AND FDuciARY CONSIDERATIONS
The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsi-
bility4 (the Code), and its predecessor, the Canons of Professional
4 The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American Bar
Association House of Delegates on August 12, 1969 and became effective January 1, 1970.
It replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics which were originally promulgated in 1908.
See generally Symposium, American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility,
48 T_xAs L. REV. 255 (1970).
The Code consists of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The
nine canons are "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession." ABA CODE OF PROESSlONxA
RESPONSIBrrITY, PRxELINuY STATEMET 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
Ethical Considerations [hereinafter cited as EC] embody the highest conduct to which
the profession is to aspire; Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter cited as DR] are mandatory in
nature and set forth the minimum standards of conduct. Id. See also Wright, The Code
of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 Aan. L. Rav. 1, 10-11
(1970).
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Ethics (the Canons), do not contain a disciplinary rule or canon that is
specifically directed at the sale of a law practice. Moreover, few re-
ported cases have considered the propriety of such transactions. This
paucity of specific proscriptions may be responsible for the willingness
of some attorneys to engage in such transactions and explains the exis-
tence of brokers who encourage them. Nevertheless several ethical
tenets and fiduciary duties may be breached by an attorney selling
his practice, because the purchase price will necessarily include a
value assigned to the expectation of future business, or good will.
This means that the selling attorney will be compensated for trans-
ferring his clients' loyalties. Like other fiduciaries, an attorney cannot
profit from the sale of his position of trust and confidence. All funds
received in excess of the value of the alienable tangible assets and
accounts receivable must be paid over to the beneficiaries of the fidu-
ciary relationship--the lawyer's clients.
Ethics committees' opinions consistently have rejected the notion
that good will is a salable asset of a law practice on the theory that the
practice of law is a profession and not a commercial enterprise.6 Courts
The legal effect of the profession's ethical standards differs according to state law.
California, for example, provides by legislation that its rules of professional conduct are
binding on all members of the state bar association. CALI. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6077
(West 1962). The supreme courts of other states promulgated the Canons under their
rulemaking power and accorded them a status equal to any other rule adopted by the
court. E.g., In re Elis, 359 Mo. 231, 234, 221 S.W.2d 139, 141 (1949) ("These rules have
the force and effect of judicial decision."); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 535, 97 A.2d 621,
625 (1953); Ryan v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 593, 595, 295 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1956). See In re
Annunziato's Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 973, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (Sur. Ct. 1951) (attorney
surcharged for improperly receiving compensation as a result of a fee-splitting agreement).
In other jurisdictions the ethical standards of the bar association do not bind the
courts and do not have the force of law. E.g., Bryant v. Hand, 158 Colo. 56, 59, 404
P.2d 521, 522-23 (1965); see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965). Nevertheless, in
states where rules of professional responsibility have no binding force, courts have
looked to them as a standard to test the conduct in question and many times have
reached a result consistent with them. See, e.g., In re Heirich, 10 III. 2d 357, 386-87, 140
NYE.2d 825, 839-40 (1956) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 805 (1957); Bell v.
Conner, 251 Ind. 409, 411-12, 241 N.E.2d 360, 361 (1968) (per curiam); Tokash v.
State, 232 Ind. 668, 670, 115 N.E.2d 745, 746 (1953).
In earlier cases, contracts disregarding ethical norms, whether or not in contravention
of a statutory provision, were held unenforceable by courts because they were deemed
to violate public policy. See, e.g., Van Bergh v. Simons, 286 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1961)
(layman unable to enforce fee-splitting agreement with attorney); Porter v. Jones,
176 F.2d 87 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 885 (1949) (same); Reilly v. Beekman,
24 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1928) (same); Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78, 24 P. 846 (1890) (same).
For a general discussion of the legal force of ethical norms, see H. Dmax~x, LEGAL
ETmcs 26-30 (1953); Goldberg, Dual Practice of Law and Accountancy: A Lawyer's
Paradox, 1966 DURE L.J. 117, 120; 24 Mo. L. Rxv. 557, 559 (1959).
GThe rule has most recently been applied in Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d
Cir. 1971) where a mutual fund adviser was required to disgorge profits received as a
result of the sale of his advisory office. See, e.g., Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 114
N.W. 1047 (1908) (guardian); Heineman v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 92 S.W. 1131
(1905) (dictum) (trustees of fraternal society); Ellicott v. Chamberlin, 38 N.J. Eq. 604
(1884) (executor).
6E.g., ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ErnIcs, OPnioNs, Nos. 300 (1961), 266
(1945) [hereinafter cited as ABA, OsInmIONs]; AssOcATiroN OF THE BAR OF SE CiTy oF
NEW YoRx, COMm. ON PROFEsSIONAL ETics, OpINIoNs, Nos. 633 (1943), 588 (1941),
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have agreed with this reasoning and have refused to permit attorneys
to receive compensation for good will.' Their rationale seems to have
been that if any good will exists it is incapable of valuation and non-
transferable because it was personal and attached to an individual.8
This reasoning does not answer the question whether it is ethically
desirable to permit attorneys to engage in such sales. An examination
of specific applications of both a lawyer's duty to his clients and his
duty to the public will demonstrate that it would be ethically improper
to do so.
A. Duty to the Client
As a fiduciary of the highest order," an attorney's loyalty to the
interests of his clients is paramount and should not be potentially
compromised by a sale to the highest bidder" In the sale of a law
practice, there may be three threats to the clients' interests. Receiving
money for the endorsement of another places the lawyer in an irrecon-
cilable conflict of interest. An attorney may reveal the confidences and
secrets of his clients to his buyer. After the sale, the purchasing attor-
ney may increase his clients' costs by splitting fees with his predecessor
otherwise than on the basis of work actually performed or responsi-
bilities assumed.
1. Conflicts of Interest
The most convincing reason for the proscription of the sale of a
law practice is that a lawyer's recommendation should not be bought
by an interested third party. The sale of a law firm's good will in-
evitably means that the recommendation of the seller in favor of the
buyer will not be made solely on the basis of "disinterested and in-
formed"'" considerations, but rather will be influenced by financial
self-interest.
printed in OPINIoNs or =T CommsnTTmas ONr PRoanssioNAL Emics or Tm AssOcIATION
or =E BAR O THE CiTy OF NEw YORK ANn =E NEW Yoax COUNTY LAwYM' Associ-
ATION (1956) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. CITY BAR ASSN, OpnnONs].
7 O'Rear v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 473, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1935) (dictum); Little v.
Caldwell, 101 Cal. 533, 36 P. 107, 109 (1894); Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54
Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966); In re Martin's Estate, 178 Misc. 43, 33 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sur. Ct.
1941).
8 In Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966), the plaintiff,
after the law firm of which he had been a partner was dissolved, sought to collect his
interest in the good will of the firm. The court rejected his demand by noting:
The "good will" which plaintiff claims-the expectation of future business--is
personal and confidential and attaches to the individual partners of the firm,
thus, no monetary value can be attributed to it and there is nothing to sell.
Id. at 526, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
9 Henry Drinker has assembled an imposing list of cases and eloquent quotations.
H. DRwNER, supra note 4, at 89-96.
10 ABA CODE, EC 5-1, 5-2.
"ABA CODE, EC 2-8. Cf. Linnick v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 17, 21, 396 P.2d 33, 35,
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One commentator has suggested that this concern should no longer
be controlling because the profession has developed "more uniform
training and quality of practitioners," and therefore, the proscription
against the sale of a law practice now may be appropriately recon-
sidered. 2 Implicit in this proposal is the notion that successful com-
pletion of legal licensing requirements makes every lawyer worthy of
recommendation regardless of the demands of clients' affairs. Bar
examinations and other professional prerequisites, however, are not
designed to guarantee expertise in all aspects of legal practice, but to
assure a minimal level of understanding of the basic substantive areas
of the law. Precisely because attorneys do vary widely in ability, com-
petence, and experience, the recommendation of a lawyer who possesses
only the minimal qualifications of the profession to a client whose
affairs call for specialized expertise or experienced guidance without an
explicit disclosure that the designated attorney may be unable to render
the quality of services the client has grown to expect or his affairs
require would be unsatisfactory. Indeed, such a recommendation might
be of less value than a random selection from a list of members of the
bar. If such a degree of care were the standard, the relationship of
trust and confidence so necessary between attorney and client would
be threatened. A client is entitled to a recommendation of the best
successor available.
More fundamentally, this argument does not answer the question
whether it is ever ethical, even assuming all potential successors are
equally qualified, for a lawyer to receive payment for recommending
a successor (thereby representing he is superior to others) without
disclosing the financial arrangements and their potential implications to
his clients. The Code recognizes that serious conflicts of interest arise
when an attorney is paid by a third party and stresses that an attorney
should not accept compensation from anyone except his client, unless
the attorney receives the consent of the client upon full disclosure."
The flyers distributed by professional practice brokers suggest that in
the unlikely event of a complete disclosure of the sale price, clients
would be less likely to accept the advice urging them to continue with
the successor attorney.' 4 The attorney who wants to be paid for recom-
41 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1964) ("[A paid solicitorl may not keep the best interests of the
clients paramount when he profits from his referrals. He is likely to refer claimants, not
to the most competent attorney, but to the one who is compensating him.").
1
2 Cantor, The Value of a Lawyer's Interest In His Practice, 43 N.Y. ST. B.j. 47, 51
(1971).
13 ABA CoDE, EC 2-21. See also H. DRiNxER, supra note 4, at 96-99. As a matter
of law, disclosure is probably required by general fiduciary principles. See, e.g., Rosenfeld
v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971); Reilly v. Beekman, 24 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1928).
14 See text accompanying note 1 supra & app.
1972]
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mending a successor and does not wish to undergo the probable embar-
rassment inherent in such a disclosure has only one proper choice: he
can charge the client directly for this advice.
2. Confidentiality
By selling his practice an attorney may also violate a cardinal
rule of the attorney-client relationship-his duty to preserve the con-
fidences and secrets of his clients. 5 An attorney who wants to have
another assume the responsibility of his practice cannot simply sell the
matters pending and the clients' files because such a sale would breach
the confidentiality of their relationship. As a legal matter, substitution
of attorneys can only be made with the consent of the client. 6 Like-
wise, a lawyer cannot dispose of his clients' property without specific
authorization. 7 If an attorney were to turn over the clients' files to a
chosen successor without the consent of his clients, the attorney would
be breaching fiduciary duties.'
The duty is a continuing one which does not expire with the ter-
mination of the attorney-client relationship. 9 The Code specifically
acknowledges this by stating that "a lawyer should not attempt to sell
a law practice as a going business because, among other reasons, to do
so would involve the disclosure of confidences and secrets."20 Clearly,
the claim of the law practice peddlers that "work in process" and
"custody of records" are items that may be considered alienable assets
of a lawyer's practice is of questionable merit.
This does not mean, however, that it would never be appropriate
to transfer the records, papers, and files to another attorney. A lawyer
should make arrangements in advance of retirement, disability, or
death for the protection of his clients' interests, but the desires of each
client should prevail.2 ' If the records are given to another attorney,
instead of directly returned to the client, the recipient must understand
15 ABA CODE, DR 4-101; see CAEAF. Bus. & PRop. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1962) ("It
is the duty of an attorney: ... [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself to preserve the secrets, of his clients.").
'4 Cloer v. Superior Court, 271 Cal. App. 2d 143, 76 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969); see
Jacobson v. Ashinaze, 337 Ill. 141, 168 N.E. 647 (1929); Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241,
3 N.W. 78 (1879); H. DaMIKr, supra note 4, at 191.
V7 Cf. ABA CODE, DR 9-102 (B) (4).
Is See WiscoNSnq BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS, No. A-1963, 38 WIs. B. BuLL., Dec., 1965,
Supp. 49 (attorney cannot sell his practice or his clients' files). Cf. hi iNOlS STATE BAR
Ass'N, OPINIONs, No. 180 (1960) (successor cannot keep files over client's request for
their return).
19 ABA CODE, EC 4-6.
20 d. (footnote omitted); see ABA, OPNiONS, No. 266 (1945); ILLInois STATE BAR
ASS'N, OPoioNs, No. 180 (1960); Katten, Sale of a Law Practice-Federal Tax and
Ethical Aspects, 54 ILL. B.J. 686, 691 (1966).
21 ABA CODE, EC 4-6.
SALE OF A LAW PRACTICE
that he may hold them only as a custodian.' Because it would be un-
ethical for the recipient/custodian to inspect or see them, it has been
suggested that the files and documents be encased and sealed prior to
deliverys2 The client, in any event, must be told by the custodian that
he is free to engage the attorney of his choice.24
3. Fee Splitting
The Code, retaining the principles of canon 34 of the Canons,
recognizes that fee splitting can present substantial ethical problems.25
Consequently, an attorney is forbidden from sharing fees with a non-
lawyer26 or with a lawyer, unless the division of fees is made in propor-
tion to services performed or responsibility assumed 7 This proscrip-
tion has been applied to the sale of a law practice.
Canon 34 was used repeatedly to prevent arrangements in which
a previously unassociated attorney agreed to share a percentage of the
legal fees from a deceased lawyer's practice over a term of years with
the deceased lawyer's widow, heirs, or estate.28 The theory behind this
reading of the canon was that the estate would become in effect an
unauthorized partner in the practice, interfering with the lawyer's
ability to exercise independent judgment.
The requirement that attorneys share fees only on the basis of
services or responsibility was directed initially at a long standing prac-
tice whereby one lawyer would forward a case to another, or recom-
mend an attorney to a client, and receive one-third of the fee earned by
the recipient. 9 But the rationale of the prohibition, barring excessive
2 2 
IxOIS STATE BAR ASS'N, OPINIoNs, No. 180 (1960).
23 Id.
24 ABA, OPINIoNs, No. 266 (1945).
25 See generally ABA CODE, CANONS 2, 3.
2 6 d., DR 3-102(A) (footnote omitted) proides that:
A lawyer or a law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except...
[three non-relevant exceptions].
2 7Id., DR 2-107(A) (footnotes omitted) requires the following:
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is
not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure
that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsi-
bility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compen-
sation for all legal services they rendered the client.28 ABA, OPINIoNs, No. 266 (1945); ABA Com~r. oN PROrESSIONAL ETmcs, IN-
PoRm sl OpxoNs, No. 550 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ABA, NmoRM AL OPmI-ONS];
N.Y. Crr r BAR Ass' x, OpIoNs, No. 646 (1943); see N.Y. CITY BAR Ass'x, OPINoNs,
Nos. 633 (1943), 272 (1933), 100 (1928-1929).
2 9 H. DRixKER, supra note 4, at 186. The ethical prohibition against fee splitting
between attorneys has received widespread acceptance by bar association ethics com-
mittees. E.g., ABA, OPNqIONS, Nos. 265 (1945), 204 (1940), 153 (1936), 73 (1932);
ABA, INFoRmAL Opimoxs, No. 932 (1966); Los ANGEEs BAR Ass'x, OPINIONS, No. 232,
31 L.A.B. lurLL. 339 (1956); FLoRIDA BAR As'N, Opminxos, No. 62-10, 37 Ft, B.J. 244
19721
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charges to clients, covers more than just "referral fees." An attorney
has a duty not to charge more than a reasonable fee, which requires
consideration of the interests of both client and lawyer.8 0 If an attorney
must pay a portion of his fee to another, there may be pressure to
charge more than the services rendered would otherwise merit,81 Thus,
one purpose of prohibiting fee splitting is the "avoidance of arrange-
ments which unnecessarily inflate the client's cost."" Moreover, if the
servicing attorney must pay a portion of his fee to another, the client is
likely to receive lower quality services, since the attorney will be
tempted to do a hurried or incomplete job in order to make that piece
of business profitable.8
It has been suggested that the lawyer who recommends another
has a grave responsibility and should be compensated for this "ser-
vice."14 This argument overlooks, however, the fact that recommending
an attorney can scarcely be considered a legal service. In fact, several
courts have specifically held that it is not and have refused to uphold
fee splitting agreements between attorneys. As Henry ])rinker has
succinctly stated, "selling a man a client is not a legal service,""
Not all purchases of a law firm are financed by splitting the fees of
(1963); N.Y. Crr BAR AssN, OPnows, No. 500 (1939); NORTH CAROLiNA STATE BAR
Ass', OPINTONS, No. 344 (1961); OREGoN STATE BAg AeS'N, Qp T QNs, No. 108, 22 ORE.
ST, B, BuLL. 8 (1962); PHILADELP IA BAR Ass'N, OpnqIoNs, No. 62-4 (1962); WASinrG-
TON STATE BAR ASS'N, OPnIONS, No. 10 (1951). It has been suggested, however, that In
practice the proscription is more honored in the breach thaA the observance. E.g., Cady,
Canons to the Code of Professional Responsibilty, 2 CONN. L. REv. 222, 236 (1969);
McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA.
L. REv. 399,414-16 (1951); 24 AB .AJ. 129 (1938).
30 ABA CODE, EC 2-17,
81 E.g., McFarland v. George, 3!6 S.W.2d 662, 671-72 (Mo. App. 1958), n1.dtp in
24 Mo. L. REv. 557 (1959).
82 Emmons, Wifliams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar, 6 Cal. App. 3d $65, 574, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 367, 373 (1970); see Reilly v. Beekman, 24 F.2d 791, 794 (2d Cir. 1928) ("[The
client] was entitled to have him recommend an attorney, the amount of whose fees
would depend on the services he had to perform, and would not be affected by what he
had to pay out to the plaintiff for an introduction to the client.'); Alpers v, Hunt, 86
Cal. 78, 88, 24 P. 846, 849 (1890); cf. Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules against
Solicitation by Lawyqrs, 2$ U. Cn, L. Rxv, 674, 683-84 (1958).
88 Sometimes, however, a specialist can be so much more efficient than the general
practitioner at a given job that he can pay a referral fee and come out with
approximately the same net profit per hour of input. If he can be that efficient,
however, it would seem that either the lawyer who does the work or the client
should have the economic benefit, rather than the lawyer who merely makes the
referral.
Brizius, Advice to the Young Lawyer on Building a Practice, 17 PRAc. LAw., Feb. 1971,
at 13, 32. But see L. PATTERsoN & E. CHEATHAm, supra note 2, at 276-77.
84 The Determination of Professional Fees from the Ethical Viewpoint, A Panel
Discussion, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 434 (1954).
85 The leading case is McFarland v. George, 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. 1958). See
Well v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160 (1929); Silver v. Paulson, 285 App. Div. 1059, 139 N.Y.S.2d
456 (1955); Clark v. Robinson, 252 App. Div. 857, 299 N.Y.S. 474 (1937); Orenstein v.
Alpert, 39 Misc. 2d 1093, 242 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sur. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 720,
247 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1964); In re Annunziato's Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 108 NY.S.2d 101
(Sur. Ct. 1951).
8 The Determination of Professional Fees from the Ethical Viewpoint, A Panel
Discussion, 7 I. FLA. L. REv. 433, 434 (1954).
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the successor over time; some practices are bought for a predetermined
amount. A distinction between the two types of payment might be
drawn by reasoning that the seller who receives a sum certain will have
no continuing interest in influencing his former clients to remain with
the purchaser, because the amount received does not depend upon the
buyer's success. This justification ignores the fact that in most cases
the amount of a fixed sum would be based on revenues a successor
anticipated receiving from the seller's former clients. Furthermore, the
agreement between attorneys most probably would require that the
seller recommend the buyer to his clients and otherwise assist him in
securing their business and may even make payment contingent upon
the purchaser's reaching a predetermined level of gross revenue within
a specified period following the transfer. Only to the extent that pay-
ment, whether a sum certain or a portion of the future fees, for a law
practice represents compensation to the retiring attorney for services
actually rendered or responsibilities assumed, is it ethically proper.3 7
B. Duty to the Public
Every individual should have the maximum opportunity to freely
choose his own lawyer, and attorneys should assist in making legal
counsel available28 Although this two-part proposition is tied to a
lawyer's duty to his individual clients and to the profession's responsi-
bility to maintain ethical norms, it has broader significance. The
public has an interest in ensuring that attorneys will practice inde-
pendently and that an individual will not be misled when selecting an
attorney. These interests are threatened when the selling attorney
solicits clients for his successor, when he agrees to adhere to a restric-
tive covenant as part of the sales agreement, or when the purchasing
attorney practices under a misleading name.
1. Solicitation
When a retiring attorney recommends a successor for a fee, he
becomes in effect a paid solicitor of business for that attorney. By the
87 1LLNOIS STATE BAR Ass'N, OPINIONs, Nos. 231, 239 (1964); NEw JERSEY STATE
Bn Ass'x, OPIoNs, No. 48, 87 N.J.LJ. 459 (1964); TEXAS BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS, No.
266 (1963), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 341 (1966); WISCONSIN BAR As'N, OPINIONS,
No. A-1963, 38 Wis. B. BuLL., Dec. 1965, Supp. at 49.
Several courts have refused to hold either that fee-splitting agreements between
attorneys and former partners or former partners' estates are ethically proper or that
subsequent fees are a partnership asset to which a deceased partner's estate is entitled to
an accounting. Stuart v. Murray, 70 Colo. 449, 202 P. 179 (1921); Justice v. Laity,
19 Ind. App. 272, 49 N.E. 459 (1898); Isenhart v. Hazen, 10 Kan. App. 577, 63 P. 451
(1901); Moffat v. Crescap, 33 App. Div. 54, 304 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1969), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d
856, 277 N.E.2d 926, 328 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1971); In re Martin's Estate, 178 Misc. 43, 33
N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sur. Ct. 1941); Schulder v. Dickson, 66 Utah 418, 243 P. 377 (1926);
Puffer v. Merton, 168 Wis. 366, 170 N.W. 368 (1919).
38 See generally ABA CODE, CANoN 2.
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same token, the buyer is purchasing that recommendation. Although
the original reasons for proscribing solicitation by lawyers were more
concerned with preserving the dignity of the profession,39 the Code
has retained the proscription on the fundamental notion that the selec-
tion of an attorney should be based on the earned reputation of the
lawyer. If a recommendation is sought by or given to a layman, the
recommendation should be free of influence from the designated at-
torney.40 Thus, an attorney is forbidden from requesting recommenda-
tions,41 assisting or rewarding48 one who recommends his services,
recommending himself or others in whom he has a financial interest
unless specifically asked for advice, 44 or accepting employment when he
knows it was a result of such unethical conduct 45
By condemning both the solicitor and the buyer of the recommenda-
tion, the Code reaches the sale of a deceased attorney's practice ac-
complished through the recommendations of the widow or heirs. The
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, prior to the adoption of the
Code, similarly concluded that a purchaser is precluded "from soliciting
by arrangement with the estate of a deceased lawyer the latter's clients
to continue their business with him, or from permitting the widow or




It is customary for sales of a retiring practitioner's law practice
to be accompanied by the promise of the seller that he will not engage
in the practice of law in the immediate vicinity. The effective transfer
39 H. DRENER, supra note 4, at 210-12.
4OABA CODE, EC 2-3, 2-4, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8. Other policies are summarized in L.
PATERSON & E. CimATA, supra note 2, at 357-58.
41 ABA CoDE, DR 2-103 (C).
421d., DR 2-103(D).
431d., DR 2-103(B).
44 Id., DR 2-103(A).
45Id., DR 2-103(E).
California, which has not adopted the Code as its official guide, has created an ex-
ception to these rules. California's Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated under
CAL. Bus. & PROF. Coox § 6076 (West 1962), generally prohibit a lawyer from employing
or remunerating others for soliciting professional employment. CAL. RuLEs or PaorEs-
sIONAL CoNucr, No. 3. It excludes, however, situations in which an attorney, leaving
practice to enter the armed forces, arranges with another to handle the business of his
regular clients. Id., No. 2(c). The exception permits the attorney entering the armed
services to notify his clients personally or by mail and to state that "Mr. Successor has
my entire confidence, and I believe can handle your affairs during my absence." He
may additionally apprise his clients of the successors experience. Id. A division of fees
between the departing lawyer and his successor is also allowed. Id. See N.Y. CITY BAR
AssN, Opnmors, No. 602 (1942). The rule is silent whether the clients are entitled to
full disclosure of the arrangement, but generally ethical and fiduciary principles would
seem to require it. See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
46 ABA, Opnroxs, No. 266 (1945). See opinions cited in note 28 supra.
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of a practice often requires that loyal former clients of the vendor do
not have the opportunity to continue to employ him. If the community
in which the seller practices has few or no other attorneys, the suc-
cessor can effectively succeed to the practice by simply paying the seller
not to practice there. Such covenants can deprive the former and poten-
tial clients of the ability to engage the counsel of their choice and make
the lawyer-client relationship a marketable piece of merchandise.
In an analogous situation, an ethics opinion,47 since codified and
extended by the Code,48 proscribed such clauses in employment con-
tracts. The opinion rested primarily on the grounds that restrictive
covenants unjustifiably constrained a lawyer's right to decide where he
will practice and were inconsistent with his professional status. In
response to the argument that restrictive covenants were necessary to
prevent client stealing by former employees, the opinion noted that
the Canons sufficiently guarded against this evil by prohibiting solicita-
tion and any efforts to obtain the clients of a former employer. More-
over, a client's right "to decide who shall represent him"49 is a superior
consideration. The result should be the same for restrictive covenants
as part of a sale agreement.5" Should a seller have a change of heart
and desire to practice in the same area again, he may send formal
notices to his former clients, but will be otherwise prohibited by the
Code from advertising his return to practice.51 The desires of loyal
clients should not be impaired by any other restrictions on the lawyer's
practice.
Some American decisions hold that such covenants, despite their
ethical impropriety, are enforceable and that either damages52 or an
injunction 53 would lie in event of their breach. One court upholding
such a covenant, took the position that "[i] t is not necessary for us to
determine whether the contract violates some canon of professional
ethics."54 These decisions, antedating the Code, followed the much
47ABA, OPINIONS, No. 300 (1961). See ABA, INPORmA OPINIONs, No. 521 (1962);
ALTEG=E Y CouN y BAR ASs'N, OPINIONS, No. 1962-3; N.Y. CiTy BAR Ass'N, OPiIONS,
No. 688 (1945).
48 ABA CODE, DR 2-108.
4 9 H. DInmm,, supra note 4, at 191; cf. 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 412 (1969).
5OBritish law allows solicitors to use restrictive covenants appurtenant to sales
agreements, but not to employment contracts. The distinction is made on the ground that
in an employment contract such a covenant "does not protect the employer's existing
interests, but confers on him a new benefit." A. CoRmDEY, SoLuciroRs 481 (6th ed. 1968).
For further discussion, see note 55 infra.
51 ABA CODE, DR 2-102 (A) (2) ; ABA, OPInIoNs, No. 301 (1961).
52 Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241, 3 N.W. 78 (1879).
5 3 Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11 111. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956) ; Heinz v. Roberts,
135 Iowa 748, 110 N.W. 1034 (1907); Thorn v. Dinsmoor, 104 Kan. 275, 178 P. 445
(1919).
54 Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11 111. App. 2d 541, 550, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (1956). The
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regretted British practice permitting solicitors, but not barristers, to
sell their practice.r 5 Furthermore, the lawsuits all arose after a seller
had received his consideration and returned to practice in the same
area. The sellers defended on the theory that the contracts violated
public policy and should not be judicially enforced, but the courts,
unduly emphasizing the seller's ability to reap the benefits of the
bargain without bearing its burdens, upheld the contracts. A successor
attorney's desire to be free from future competition should be sub-
ordinate to the interest of the public in having an unfettered right to
select legal counsel. Courts would best serve this aim by refusing to
enforce restrictive covenants between attorneys, thereby discouraging
their use.
3. Misleading Name
A purchaser of a law firm often desires to begin practicing under
a new firm name consisting of his and the selling attorney's. The pur-
pose is, of course, to benefit from the good will or recognition factor
of the seller's name. Also, the new name gives the impression that the
seller has enough confidence and trust in his successor to make him a
partner-perhaps the strongest possible endorsement. Both because
the attorney-client relationship is personal and based upon trust56 and
because the name under which one practices materially affects the
volume of business of the practice, 57 using the name of another attor-
ney with whom one has never practiced may mislead a prospective
client, and therefore, should be avoided. The Code requires that "a
lawyer in private practice should practice only under his own name,
Illinois State Bar Association Professional Ethics Committee later followed Hicklin and
rejected the argument "that having been licensed by the State, the licensee cannot deprive
the public of his services by bargaining away his license privileges," and held that a
covenant not to compete was ethical, even though recognizing that the sale of a practice
was not. Inn'oIs STATE BAR ASSN, OPnIONs, No. 148 (1958).
55 See Bunn v. Guy, 102 Eng. Rep. 803 (K.B. 1803); Austen v. Boys, 44 Eng. Rep.
1133 (Ch. 1858); Candler v. Candler, 37 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ch. 1821); A. CoRDERY, SoLuc-
ITORS 483-84 (6th ed. 1968).
The English judiciary has expressed doubts about the advisability of their practice.
As early as 1821 Lord Eldon stated:
It has happened to me to know, that it is no uncommon thing for gentlemen
leaving the profession to stipulate for an annuity payable out of the future
profits. I have thought that, consistently with the policy of the law, agree-
ments could not be made by which they contract to recommend those who succeed
them. I doubted whether professional men could be recommended, not for skill
and knowledge in their profession, but for a sum of money paid and advanced.
Candler v. Candler, 37 Eng. Rep. 834, 836 (Ch. 1821); accord, Whittaker v. Howe, 49
Eng. Rep. 150, 153 (1841). Nevertheless, the practice has been sanctioned since 1803.
For an early American case questioning Bunn v. Guy, see Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78,
88-90, 24 P. 846, 849-50 (1890). See generally Cantor, The Value of a Lawyer's Interest
In His Practice, 43 N.Y. ST. B.J. 47, 47-48 (1971); Note, The Death of a Lawyer,
56 CoLum. L. REv. 606, 617-18 (1956).
56 ABA CoDE, EC 2-9.
57 Cf. Id., EC 2-11.
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the name of a lawyer employing him, or a partnership name composed
of the name of one or more of the lawyers practicing in a partnership.""
Similarly, many opinions of ethics committees have held it improper
for a lawyer to practice under a firm name where the individuals whose
names are used have never truly been partners or no partnership
exists.59
An argument can be made that the use of a selling attorney's name
by his successor is justified when they share in the profits. Holding
aside the general objection to fee splitting, the mere division of the
successor's future profits is insufficient to create a relationship possess-
ing enough attributes of a partnership to entitle the successor to use
the seller's name. In one case considered by the ABA Professional
Ethics Committee, two lawyers practicing in different cities sought to
associate for the sole purpose of splitting fees from specialized business
one referred to the other. The referring attorney wanted to use the
other's name in his practice. The arrangement was held to be unethical
because the referring attorney would be nothing more than a paid
solicitor for the other;60 therefore no true partnership would exist in
which both attorneys shared work and responsibility. The same ra-
tionale applies to the relationship existing between a purchaser and
seller of a law practice.61
III. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRACTICAL DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
SOLE PRACTITIONERS AND PARTNERS
A. The Practical Discrimination
The Code specifically allows payment pursuant to a prior agree-
ment to be made to a retired partner62 or to a deceased partner's
estate63 Ethical Consideration 3-8 states that the pecuniary interest of
GSABA CODE, EC 2-11. EC 2-11 also permits attorneys to practice "if permitted by
law, in the name of a professional legal corporation, which should be dearly designated
as such." See also ABA CODE, DR 2-102 (C).
-59ABA, OsINIONs, Nos. 277 (1948), 126 (1935), 115, 106 (1934); ABA, INropa&Ar
OPmrONs, Nos. 730, 684, 632 (1963); N.Y. CITY BAR ASS'N, OPnIoNs, No. 607 (1942);
TEXAS STATE BAR Ass'ir, OpmiONS, No. 263 (1963), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 339
(1966); WASmINGTON STATE BAR Ass'N, OPnIONs, No. 19 (1952); NEW JERSEY STATE
BAR ASS'N, OpInIoNs, No. 25, 87 N.J.J. 19 (1964); cf. ABA, OPnaoNs, No. 316,
reprinted in 53 A.B.AJ. 838 (1967).
160 ABA, Opinlows, No. 277 (1948).
61 One exception to the general rule, which the Code permits and which is widely
employed, is the continued use of the name of one or more deceased partners. ABA CODE,
DR 2-102(B). That exception, however, only applies when the attorney or attorneys
using the name of the deceased were actually members of the deceased's firm. Thus, it
would be improper for a lawyer to attempt to buy the use of a deceased attorney's name
from his estate. NEW JERSEY STATE BAR AssN, Op noNs, No. 25, 87 N.J.L.J. 19 (1964);
N.Y. CITy BA Ass'N, OpnioNs, No. 760 (1951) ; see H. DRINKER, suPra note 4, at 208.
62 ABA CODE, DR 2-107(B). The practical discrimination between sole practitioners
and partners is noted in Thurm, Disposal of an Attorney's Practice, 59 A.B.AJ. 68 (1973).
08 Id., DR 3-12 (A) (1).
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a deceased partner's interest in his firm may be paid to the estate.
Recently ABA Opinion 32764 held that it was permissible under the
Code for a law firm to "make payments to a retired partner or for a
fixed period to the estate of a deceased partner in accordance with a
preexisting retirement plan, the amount of those payments being mea-
sured by subsequent earnings of the firm."6 Thus upon retirement the
partner (but not the sole practitioner) can share future earnings with
his successor.
When a partnership is dissolved, either by the death or retirement
of a partner, the survivors or the retiring partner may attempt to per-
suade the partner's clients to continue with the firm, because the clients
have presumably contracted with the partnership.6 Indeed the sur-
vivors have a duty to take care of the affairs of these clients. 7 Thus,
those attorneys who practiced in a partnership can actively woo old
clients, while a sole practitioner and his successor cannot.
Partners may disclose the affairs of clients among themselves and
their associates, unless a client directs otherwise 6 Thus, upon the
retirement or death of a member, they do not need to take special pre-
cautions with client's files, or send notices to clients informing them
of their right to recover their files. Sole practitioners and their suc-
cessors, however, must do so.
The Code permits partners of a firm to restrict the right of a retir-
ing member to practice law as a condition to the payment of retirement
benefits.0 9 A sole practitioner's successor, as we have seen, cannot so
restrict his predecessor, even if similar payments could be made.
Finally, partners may retain the name of a former partner in the
firm, if he does not continue to practice elsewhere. 70 On the other hand,
the sole practitioner cannot lend, nor can the successor use, his name
to aid the practice of the successor.
B. A Justification
Treating sole practitioners, comprising the largest single practice
classification of the profession, 71 differently from attorneys practicing
in partnership, generally the more successful members of the legal
14 ABA, OPMIONS, No. 327 (Supp. 1971).
65 Id.
10 6 Note, The Death of a Lawyer, 56 CoLum. L. R v. 606, 616 (1956).
67E.g., Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553, 36 P. 107 (1894).
68 ABA CoDE, EC 4-2.
691d., DR 2-108(A).
701d., EC 2-11.
/Aa RicA BAR FOUNDATION, 1971 LAWYER STATISTIcAL REPORT 10-11 (1972).
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community,7 can be justified only if we decide that the interests of a
firm's clients, actual and potential, are furthered.7 3 Although, as the
following discussion will demonstrate, neither conclusion is certain, on
balance it appears that the present distinction produces a fundamentally
sound result.
The distinction can be justified on the basis of the quality of legal
services a client may receive. There is a real danger that the seller of a
one-man practice may be more interested in obtaining a successor who
is willing to pay the highest price, rather than one who is the best
suited to his clients. The clients of a lawyer who has practiced with
partners, however, are not imperiled by the payment of retirement or
death benefits. Their interests are protected for two interrelated
reasons. First, a partnership's process of choosing a new member en-
sures that in most cases points of view other than those of the retiring
partner (or of the deceased partner's estate) will be represented.
Unlike the situation with a sole practitioner, the death or retirement
of a partner does not immediately occasion the selection of a successor
with the bargaining inherent in such a procedure. Retirement or death
benefits are determined by the partnership long before there is an
actual need to pay them.
Secondly, the interests of a partnership welcoming a new member
are generally coextensive with its clients because the senior partners'
financial success and reputations will depend on the performance of
their new partner with whom they must practice for a number of years.
Where the departing partner's firm operates as a true partnership and
other members and associates have at least occasionally handled his
clients' affairs "[t]he interests of the client would not seem to be
endangered . . .since it is probable that the client was not only ac-
quainted with the partner's work but also fully aware of the qualifica-
tions of the firm as a whole."74
There are limits, however, to the manner in which partners are
able to capitalize upon their "good will" and client relationships. When
a partner sells his partnership interest to a previously unassociated
lawyer, his concerns parallel those of the seller of a solo practice. The
clients may be afforded a modicum of protection if the seller's partners
7 2 Lawyers practicing in partnerships earn approximately two to three times more
than sole practitioners. Smith & Clifton, Income of Lawyers 1963-1964, 54 A.BAJ. 51,
52 (1968).
7 3 For the view that this type of discrimination results from the practical operation
of the Code in most contexts, see Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of
the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WAsir. L. REv. 244 (1968); Comment,
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970). See also Teschner, Lawyer
Morality, 38 Geo. WAsir. L. REv. 789 (1970); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar
Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. Civ. R G 's-CiV. Lem. L. REv. 301, 348-54 (1970).
7 4 Note, The Death of a Lawyer, 56 CoLum. L. R v. 606, 617 (1956).
322 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:306
are in a position to play a meaningful role in the selection process.
Nevertheless, if the departing partner is withdrawing a large interest,
his partners may be unprepared to meet his financial demands, or if he
has the power to take important clients with him, they may be unable
to be as exacting as they would otherwise desire. For these reasons
the sale of a partnership interest to a newcomer is prohibited.75
The public will not be misled by permitting partnerships to retain
the name of deceased or retired partners who no longer practice. A
client might bring business to a law office carrying the name of a
retired or deceased practitioner and believe that his services were still
available or that the remaining attorneys had been associated with the
practitioner. If a firm were a partnership, the client could justifiably
rely on the reputation of the attorney named in the letterhead, and be
reasonably assured that his associates and successor had been carefully
chosen. Furthermore, the continued use of the practitioner's name
makes clear that the partnership itself is a continuing organization and
not simply a group of identified individual lawyers. Typically, the
reputation and prestige attached to the partnership name is a product
of the efforts of all the members, named or not, "and the loss of iden-
tification and good will with changes in firm membership would be
harmful to the remaining partners without public gain." 76
On the other hand, these expectations are not justified if a law
practice is sold by a sole practitioner desiring to retire or move to
another community, by the widow of a deceased practitioner, by his
heirs who reside elsewhere, or even by the attorney who possesses a
commonplace surname and lives in an urban area. They may have little
concern for the competence of the attorney to whom the name is sold,
and any reservations remaining may be squelched by the right price.
Thus, the client who contacts the successor because he practices using
the name of his predecessor is in jeopardy of being misled.
The disparity in treatment between a sole practitioner and a part-
nership member cannot be justified by reasoning that it lowers the cost
to the clients. It makes little difference whether the successor attorney
shares fees with a previously unassociated predecessor or with a former
partner, if the successor has paid a sum in excess of the value of
tangible assets and of the work the predecessor actually performed. In
either case, the inducement to recoup the investment by charging the
clients more is the same. It is unfortunate that the ABA's opinion 327
has permitted a former partner or his estate to receive retirement bene-
75 N.Y. CnT BAR ASs'i, O moNs, No. 633 (1943).
76 L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATnAm, supra note 2, at 314.
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fits based on the future earnings of the firm. This is the first sanction,
although implicit, given to the assignment of value to the good will a
lawyer has developed. Retirement benefits based upon an average of
the departed partner's prior earnings, previously the only approved
method of calculation, may mean an equal dollar amount in practical
terms. This method, however, puts an attorney's partners on notice
that part of the fees earned, conceptually at least, will form a fund to
meet the future retirement payments. To the extent that the term of
the payments can be actuarially determined, the former clients of the
partner will have paid for these payments. On the other hand, by
shifting the measure to the partnership's subsequent profits or gross
fees, the future clients must shoulder this burden and the recipient's
welfare is tied to the firm's continued success. In the case of a retired
partner this may be beneficial, as he may take a more active interest
in the firm, but in the case of a deceased partner's designees, such an
interest may be undesirable and unethical.7"
If by approving restrictive covenants "as a condition to payment
of retirement benefits" 79 the Code has endorsed court enforcement of
such covenants with injunctive relief, it has discriminated without jus-
tification between the sole practitioner and the law firm member. It
would be inconsistent with canon 2 of the Code, 0 which imposes a
duty upon the legal profession to make counsel available, to prohibit
clients from seeking otherwise willing lawyers. No useful social pur-
pose is served by forbidding an attorney, whether formerly a sole
practitioner or a member of a partnership, from helping those who
seek his legal advice. If, however, the Code has merely stated that a
lawyer resuming practice outside of the partnership paying his retire-
ment benefits will not be permitted to gain financially from such prac-
tice, then it has produced a fair result. Courts can adequately balance
the conflicting interests of the public and of the partnerships whose
former partners have practiced in violation of the partnership agree-
ment by crediting fees earned by the former partners against the specie
fled retirement payments."
77 See notes 62-69 supra & accompanying text.
78 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
79 ABA COD, DR 2-108(A).
S0 Id., CAWoN 2,
SlIf the judiciary were to follow this suggestion, then any discrimination in treat-
ment between sellers of practices and retired partners may well be in favor of the seller.
When a seller returns to practice, he will be free from the possibility of a lawsuit brought
by the buyer for breach of a restrictive covenant and will be able to retain any considera-
tion previously advanced by the buyer. The retired partner, however, may lose sub-
stantial benefits to which his prior efforts had entitled him.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The sole practitioner who not only wants to provide properly for
the continuing affairs of his clients, but also wants to maintain his and
his family's financial security at his retirement or death, should con-
sider associating with one or more attorneys in partnership before
those needs become imminent. Not only will it be proper to receive
retirement or death payments from the practice, but his clients will
have available to them a lawyer who is familiar with their affairs and
will not be subject to the risk that his unexpected disability or death
will materially disrupt their legal matters.8"
It should not be concluded that this is an endorsement of
"quickie" partnerships, where a chosen successor merely practices un-
der the retiring practitioner's roof and name for several months. On
the contrary, the lawyer who enters into such an arrangement upon the
eve of retirement solely for the purpose of exacting a portion of the fu-
ture profits as payment for his practice does not serve his clients' in-
terests. Peddling a law practice is improper regardless of how it is
staged. Because it might be difficult at times to distinguish "quickie"
partnerships from proper ones, courts, disciplinary boards, and ethics
committees will have to scrutinize partnerships very carefully.
3
The threat of disbarment, suspension, or reprimand"" may not
deter an attorney who intends to retire or otherwise leave the profes-
sion; nor will such sanctions affect a deceased's estate or heirs. The
embarrassment of public rebuke, however, may provide some deterrent
effect, as will personal ethical standards. But prospective sellers who
disregard these considerations must also consider the advisability of
entering into a potentially unenforceable agreement. If the seller is
compelled to enforce the sale contract judicially, courts should refuse
to do so because the underlying bargain is adverse to the interests of
the clients and to the public interest. A buyer who has successfully
taken control of the practice may refuse to pay the sale price. Further-
more, the seller whose buyer does pay the agreed price may be liable
to the successor's clients for all the profits he receives, since a fiduciary
cannot profit from the sale of his fiduciary relationship.85 A successful
82 Other benefits of practicing in partnership result from the sharing of overhead,
the combination of different talents and backgrounds, the facilitation of specialization,
and the esprit d6 corps of teamwork. See P. CARNGToN & W. SurRLwAD, AaRnTcLs or
PAIsNERsnIP oR LAW Fzms (1967); R. SmITH, LAW OrrI ORGANIZATION (10th ed.
1964).
83 Notes 29-36 supra & accompanying text.
8, See generaly Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1446 (1966); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 962 (1960);
Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1955).
85 See note 5 supra & accompanying text.
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class suit by the clients would render such an agreement meaningless
to a seller.
On the other hand, buyers will most likely be younger, perhaps
recently admitted members of the Bar. The threat of suspension or
disbarment is a significant consideration. It would be of little value
to secure the seller's former clients, only to be prohibited from serving
them. It may take longer and mean fewer material amenities in the
beginning years, but a young attorney, his profession, and the public,
will be better served if he resists the sales pitch of the professional
practice brokers and develops his own practice.
APPENDIX
A typical circular advertising brokerage services for the purchase
and sale of a law practice reads as follows:
... things you should know about
Buying or Selling a Professional Practice
questions which are frequently asked...
CAN THE "GOOD WILL" OF A PROFESSIONAL PRAC-
TICE BE SOLD?
Answer: Yes, in most cases.
HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE "GOOD WILL" AS IT RE-
LATES TO AN ACTIVE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE?
Answer: The expectation of future profits from an existing
practice under the operation of someone other than the pres-
ent owner.
WHAT DETERMINES THE VALUE OF "GOOD WILL"?
Answer: About 20 to 25 different factors could influence the
value of an existing practice. The following are the most im-
portant: The other opportunities available in the same pro-
fession, type of practice or specialty, gross receipts, net profit,
significant trends, transferability of practice, source of refer-
rals, willingness of seller to assist in transfer, covenant not to
compete, location of practice, retention of employees, office
lease, equipment and furnishings, fee schedule, collection ra-
tio, reason for sale and type of clientele or patients.
CAN THE "GOOD WILL" OF PROFESSIONAL PRAC-
TICES BE APPRAISED WITH REASONABLE ACCU-
RACY?
Answer: Yes, now that a marketplace has been established
and after our exposure to hundreds of practices in many
states.
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IS THERE A "RULE OF THUMB" FORMULA THAT
COULD BE USED TO APPRAISE PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICES?
Answer: No, because there are no two practices exactly alike.
In addition, there is a great difference in value from one pro-
fession to another or from one specialty to another within the
same profession.
HOW MUCH TIME DOES IT NORMALLY TAKE TO
SELL AN EXISTING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE?
Answer: To realize the maximum price, about 90 to 180 days.
However, in many instances, we have sold practices within a
week after they were listed with us. We have hundreds of
buyers on our mailing lists. These buyers have been devel-
oped through national advertising and direct mail contacts.
We have a continuing source of new buyers in each profes-
sion.
WHAT IS [BROKER]?
Answer: [Broker] was established in 1966. We are licensed
brokers, nationwide, dealing exclusively in the sale, exchange,
merger and appraisal of professional practices and related as-
sets. Our main office is in ... , California, with branch offices
in many other states.
WHAT SERVICES DO YOU PERFORM FOR SELLERS?
Answer: When a seller elects to list his practice with us, our
services would include an evaluation of the practice, appraisal
of other assets, analysis of financial records and determina-
tion of selling price. We would make recommendations as to
various methods of sale, financial arrangements, income tax
aspects of sale, transfer of practice, how to handle uncol-
lected accounts receivable, letters of introduction, etc.
WHAT ARE YOUR FEES AND HOW PAID?
Answer: We are usually paid a commission by the seller
based upon a percentage of the selling price if we are suc-
cessful in selling the practice. Payment is made out of pro-
ceeds of sale.
DOES A SELLER NEED THE SERVICES OF [BRO-
KER] IF HE HAS FOUND HIS OWN BUYER?
Answer: Yes, because finding a buyer is not our most impor-
tant service. We offer experience in this highly specialized
field that is not available anywhere else. We have been in-
volved in hundreds of transactions and know the following:
(1) How to present the opportunity objectively as a third
party; (2) how to secure the fair market value; (3) how
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practice should be sold and what should be required of both
buyer and seller; (4) how to secure any unpaid balance; (5)
how to transfer the practice successfully; (6) what should
be included in the sales agreement; (7) how to secure financ-
ing for the buyer, if needed; (8) how to build in tax advan-
tages for seller.
CAN THE SALE OF A PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE BE
KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?
Answer: Yes, but only if negotiations are handled by a third
party. It is almost impossible for an owner to sell his own
practice without identifying himself to all prospective buyers.
This usually results in the information reaching the em-
ployees and clients, resulting in some damage to the practice
before it can be sold or transferred.
WHAT SERVICES DO YOU PROVIDE FOR BUYERS?
Answer: (1) We offer buyers a free mailing service to keep
them informed of all practices that become available through
[broker]; (2) we make practice evaluations for prospective
buyers on practices which are not listed by us; (3) we can
help secure financing; (4) we assist the buyer in the transfer
of the practice and can help him to become successful in the
new practice.
CAN ADVANCE ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR
THE SALE OF A PRACTICE IN THE EVENT OF A
SUDDEN DEATH?
Answer: Yes, by completing a form letter of instructions
which can be filed with your will. This will permit a quick
sale at near the full market value, whereas any delay in plac-
ing the practice in our hands might result in a substantial or
near total loss in value.
IF I SELL MY PRESENT PRACTICE, CAN [BROKER]
HELP ME TO RELOCATE IN THE SAME OR SOME
OTHER STATE?
Answer: Yes. At the same time that your practice is being of-
fered to prospective buyers, we can present other opportuni-
ties to you.
WHAT OTHER SERVICES ARE OFFERED BY [BRO-
KER]?
Answer: We make practice appraisals for a fee when no sale
is contemplated. We are qualified to appear as expert wit-
nesses in court proceedings where the value of the "good will"
is in dispute.
A flyer addressed directly to attorneys accompanies the above
circular:
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Dear Counselor:
We would like to introduce our firm and the services
which we offer to attorneys, accountants, physicians, dentists,
and other professionals. [Broker] is a nationwide brokerage
firm specializing in acquisitions, sales, mergers or appraisals
of professional practices. We are now selling practices from
15 offices in 11 states, serving 8 different professions.
FOR SELLERS OF LAW OFFICES-We provide the
kind of confidential services for an attorney that has not been
available heretofore. If you have been thinking of leaving
your practice within the next year or two, contemplating re-
tirement or considering a change in location, we invite you to
discuss your plans with us. We have a continuing source of
buyers with professional and financial qualifications to fit
your practice. In addition, all negotiations are conducted with
a maximum of discretion and lack of publicity. Assets consid-
ered to be a part of a legal practice might include the follow-
ing: supply inventory, law library, office furniture, office
equipment, office lease or real estate, telephone numbers, ac-
counts receivable, work in process, contingent fee cases, cus-
tody of records, future consultation services, or a partnership
interest.
FOR BUYERS OF LAW OFFICES-We advise you to
consider the purchase of an established law office which can
provide an immediate high income, or it may be to your ad-
vantage to consolidate another office with your own. Let us
know if you would like to be placed on our free mailing list to
receive information on opportunities for sale now and in the
future. Please specify the locations in which you have an in-
terest, when you will be available, and some personal history.
QUALIFIED EXPERT WITNESS ON VALUE OF
GOOD WILL-If you need to determine the true fair market
value of the good will relating to any medical, dental, ac-
counting, legal or other professional practice, one of our ex-
perienced practice appraisers can make such an evaluation
for you. Our appraisers have qualified as experts in this field
in the courts of many counties throughout the state.
Information regarding our services and fees will be fur-
nished upon request. Any inquiry will be kept strictly confi-
dential and there will be no obligation on your part.
